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Research Revisited
Frederick T. Furlong
The following two articles are reprinted here because they provide important theoretical analysis
on the effectiveness ofcapital regulation. Overthe past several years, regulatory policyhas placed an
increasing emphasis on the adequacy of bank and thrift capital. The argument is that raising bank
capital is an effective way to protect the insurance system and taxpayers, since capital represents a
bufferfor absorbing losses. With higher levels ofcapital, banks should be saferandposeless ofarisk
to the deposit insurance system. This view is reflected in Modernizing the Financial System (U.S.
Treasury 1991). That study states that "Thesingle most powerful tool to make banks safe is capital."
However, the capital position ofa bankis only one dimension ofrisk. The safetyofa bank and the
expected cost to the deposit insurance system also depend on a bank's portfolio risk, which reflects
severalfactors suchas creditrisk, thedegree ofdiversification, andinterestraterisk. Thecontroversy
addressed in the following two articles is whether banks, when forced to hold more capital, can be
expectedto adjust theirportfolio riskso as to offset, oreven more than offset, the potential for higher
levels ofcapital to reduce the risk exposure ofthe deposit insurance system.
The first article, "Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking," concludes that when banks act to
maximizetheirvalue, forcing themto hold more capital shouldreduce the riskexposureofthe deposit
insurance system. This is the case even though banks have an incentive to increase portfoliorisk with
subsidizeddeposit insurance. As shownin the article, a solventbank's incentives to increase portfolio
risk to exploit the insurance subsidy decline as its capital-to-asset ratio increases. Therefore, as long
as the rise in the bank's capital ratio is not accompanied by a relaxation of regulatory efforts to
constrain its portfolio risk, a higher level of capital at the bank should mean more protection for
taxpayers.
This conclusion for risk-neutral, value-maximizing banks is at odds with the conclusions reached
in earlierstudies concerning the effectiveness ofcapital regulation onrisk-averse, utility-maximizing
banks. These earlier studies use a mean-variance framework and conclude that banks might react to
more stringent capital standards by increasing portfolio risk to such an extent that the probability of
failure increases. That is, these earlier studies argue that forcing banks to hold more capital could be
counterproductive.The second article, "A Reexamination ofMean-Variance Analysis ofBank Capital Regulation,"
demonstrates that the analyses in the earlier studies that rely on the mean-variance framework cannot
be used to support the conclusion that capital regulation could be counterproductive.! These studies
inappropriately apply the Markowitz two-periodportfolio model, which assumes thatthe probability
offailure is always zero, to address the question ofhow capital regulation affects the probability of
failure. More specifically, the analyses in these studies leave outthe option value ofdepositinsurance
and use an inappropriate measure ofrisk, and, thus, misrepresent the return frontiers facing banks.
The two theoretical articles on capital regulation in this Review support the view that capital
regulation can be effective. That is, banks operating with higher levels ofcapital should reduce the
exposure ofthe deposit insurance system to losses. Moreover, the authors are not aware ofany other
theoretical or empirical studies that show that banks forced to hold higher levels of capital would
adjust portfolio risk so as to actually increase the probability offailure. 2
NOTES
1. Keeton (1988) considers the effects of capi-
tal regulation on risk-averse banks in a more
general framework. That study finds that for
poorly capitalized banks, increases in capital
ratios would be effective. For banks with rela-
tively high capital ratios, further increases in
capital could induce a bank to substitute asset
risk for capital risk. However, the analysis does
not indicatethatthe substitution would be such
that capital regulation would be counter-
productive.
2. Empirical work by the authors supports the
proposition that capital regulation is not coun-
terproductive. Furlong (1988) finds that for
bank holding companies in the 1980s whether
an institution was required to increase capital
in order to meet minimum regulatory require-
ments did not have a bearing on its change in
asset risk. Keeley (1990) finds that for bank
holding companies risk is negatively related to
the charter value of the holding company. This
is consistent with the view that banks with more
at stake tend to be less risky.
REFERENCES
Furlong, Frederick 1. 1988. "Changes in Bank
Risk-Taking." Federal Reserve BankofSan
Francisco Economic Review (Spring) pp.
45-56.
Keeley, Michael C. 1990. "Deposit Insurance,
Risk, and Market Power in Banking." Amer-
ican Economic Review (December) pp.
1183-1200.
Keeton, William R. 1988. "Substitutes and
Complements in Bank Risk-Taking and the
Effectiveness of Regulation." Unpublished
paper. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City.